Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Davis County v. Progressive Northwestern
Insurance Co., as the insurer of James Jensen,
Judgment Debtor : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph J. Joyce, Ryan J. Schriever, Clint A. McAdams; J. Joyce and Associates; counsel for appellee.
Trent J. Waddoups; Carr and Waddoups; counsel for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Davis County v. Progressive Northwestern, No. 20070997 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/609

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAVIS COUNTY,

Appellate Case No. 20070 997 - CA

Plaintiff / Appellant,
vs.
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN
INSURANCE CO. as the insurer of
James Jensen, Judgment Debtor,

District Court Civil No. 060904637
Priority Number: 15

Defendant / Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, PRESIDING

Mr. Joseph J. Joyce
Mr. Ryan J. Schriever
Mr. Clint A. McAdams
J. JOYCE & ASSOCIATES
10813 South River Front Pkwy., #460
South Jordan, UT 84095

Counsel for Defendant / Appellee,
Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co.

Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657)
CAJRR & WADDOUPS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C.

8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888
Fax: (801)363-8512

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Davis County

UTJA"

n|_ED
AF'-cLATE COURTS
<~. (

. ^ ^ 2008

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAVIS COUNTY,
Plaintiff / Appellant,

)
)

) Appellate Case No. 20070 997 - CA
)

vs.
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN
INSURANCE CO. as the insurer of
James Jensen, Judgment Debtor,

)
)

) District Court Civil No. 060904637
)

) Priority Number: 15
Defendant / Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, PRESIDING

Mr. Joseph J. Joyce
Mr. Ryan J. Schriever
Mr. Clint A. McAdams
J. JOYCE & ASSOCIATES
10813 South River Front Pkwy., #460
South Jordan, UT 84095

Counsel for Defendant / Appellee,
Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co.

Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657)
CARR & WADDOUPS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C.

8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888
Fax: (801)363-8512

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Davis County

TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

SUMMARY OF THE STANDARDS AND ARGUMENT

v

ARGUMENT

1

I.
II.

JUDGE ALLPHIN'S RULING WAS LEGAL ERROR
1
THE "STANDING" RULING OF JENSEN I PRECLUDES
THE APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA
2

III.

PROGRESSIVE LACKED "STANDING" TO OBTAIN A
RULING AGAINST JENSEN BECAUSE IT FAILED TO
FILE A CROSS-CLAIM

5

IV.

DAVIS COUNTY IS DIRECTLY ATTACKING THE
JUDGMENT; THEREFORE, RES JUDICATA DOES NOT
APPLY
6

V.

DAVIS COUNTY HAS A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION;
THEREFORE, RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY

6

DAVIS COUNTY'S NEW CAUSE OF ACTION IS A
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT

7

VI.

VII. PROCEDURAL PROCESSES ARE NOT APPROPRIATE
FOR THE TASK AT HAND
10
A.

Insurance Should Be Separated From Tort Law. . . . 11

B.

Section 201 Is Not Superseded By Rule 18

13

C.

Equity Disfavors Inequality That Might Result From a
Procedural Rather Than a Substantive Form of Relief.
14

D.

Davis County's Relief In This Case Creates Good Law.
16

E.
F.

The Scope of the Remedy Is the Value of the
Judgment, Plus Interest Imposed by Law

17

Affirmative Defenses Are Waived, But this Point is
Not Crucial in this Case
20

i

VIII. RES JUDICATA IS JUDGE-MADE PRINCIPLE THAT: (A)
DOES NOT APPLY; AND (B) SHOULD NOT APPLY. .. 23
A.

Issue Preclusion Does Not Apply

24

CONCLUSION

25

MAILING CERTIFICATE

26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
pages
CASES
3D Constr. & Dev., L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307, 117
P.3d 1082
24
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996)

21, 22
22

Blakely v. American Employers' Insurance Company, 424 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.
1970)
21
Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah App. 1997)

22

Coleman v. Holecek, 542 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1976)

21

Collins v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, 52 P.3d 1267

7

Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah App. 1987)

25

Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982)

12

Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1998)

14

Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985)

12

Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24,116 P.3d 263

12

Hess v. Robinson, 163 P.2d 510 (Utah 1945)

11

Maneikis v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of Illinois, 655 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1981)

v

McCorvey v. Utah State Dept. of Transp., 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993)

12

ii

Mid-America Bank & Trust Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 224 111.
App. 3d 1083 (1992)
21
Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 877 F.2d 1333 (7th
Cir. 1989)
3
Moretrench American Corp. v. S. J. Groves and Sons Co., 839 F.2d 1284 (7th
Cir. 1988)
14
National Service Industries, Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co., Inc., 937 P.2d 551
(Utah App. 1997)
5
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983)

24

Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 P.2d 121 (Utah 1965)

U

Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96

4

Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) . . . 15
Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8

13

State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992)

23

Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1990)

24

Twin
City Fire Insurance Co. v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 23 F.3d 1175
(7th Cir. 1994)
3
Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1997)
Young v. Barney, 433 P.2d 846 (Utah 1967)

4
11

RULES AND STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN.

31A-1-30K81)

9

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-201

8,18

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-2-307

7,14

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 68-3-11

8

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-la-201(2)(w)

9

UTAHCODEANN.

§ 78B-3-103

14

iii

UTAH CONST. Art VIII,

§4

13

U T A H R . C I V . P . 18(b)

10

UTAH R. CIV. P. 21

12

UTAH R. CIV. P. 4

19

U T A H R . CIV. P. 42(b)

12

UTAH R. CIV. P. 57

14

U T A H R . C I V . P . 70

19

U T A H R . C i v . P . 9(c)

10

UTAHR.EVID.402

12

UTAH R. EVID. 411

12

OTHER AUTHORITIES
14 Couch on Insurance § 203:12 (3d rev. ed. 1999)

21

17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 222

1

17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 225

9

30 C.J.S. Equity, §89

2

46 C.J.S. Insurance, § 1463

9

50 C.J.S. Judgments, § 594

6

O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897)

2

iv

SUMMARY OF THE STANDARDS AND ARGUMENT
Equity does what "should" be done. What should be done is simple.
Progressive owes money to Davis County on behalf of its negligent insured. It
should have paid for the loss caused by Jensen as soon as it received notice of
the loss or, under any circumstance, no later than the time it learned of the
judgment entered by the Second District Court against its insured.
[0]nly three options are available to a liability insurer
requested to defend an insured against claims which the
insurer believes exceed policy coverage. The insurer can
(1) seek a declaratory judgment regarding its obligations
before or pending trial of the underlying action, (2) defend
the insured under a reservation of rights^ ] or (3) refuse
either to defend or to seek a declaratory judgment at the
insurer's peril that it might later be found to have
breached its duty to defend. Once an insurer violates its
duty to defend, it is estopped to deny policy coverage
in a subsequent lawsuit by the insured or tne
insured's assignee.
Maneikis v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of Illinois. 655 F.2d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 1981) (bold
added, applying Illinois law).
Certain legal rules are raised by Progressive as hurdles to what should be
done. All of the hurdles raised by Progressive are razed by the proper
application of the law to the undisputed facts.
Both parties agree that the facts are undisputed and that this appeal
presents legal issues. The parties also agree on the identification of most of the
particular legal principles involved. The parties' disagreement relates to the
implementation of some well-known legal rules and the application of some
legal rules that have lain fallow for many decades. These legal issues are all
included in the Pena field that the Court is permitted to plow without
deference to Judge Henriod's order, Judge Allphin's order or Jensen I.
1

A reservation of rights letter is a mechanism to suspend the operation
of waiver and estoppel.
v

ARGUMENT
L

JUDGE ALLPHIN'S RULING WAS LEGAL ERROR.

Progressive does not argue that Judge Allphin's ruling was legally
correct. The ruling was unquestionably wrong.2 Progressive should have
either paid immediately or defended and then paid.
Progressive's argument is that, right or wrong, Judge Allphin's ruling
governs its obligation to pay now. It argues that finality of that order
outweighs the propriety of a correct ruling and it cites cases that have so held
under the circumstances that were present in those cases. Opposition at p. 25.
Progressive also argues that Judge Allphin's legal error cannot be challenged
by Davis County and, implicitly, that this Court is powerless to correct the legal
error — at least at this stage in the proceedings. Progressive's characterization
of this new cause of action is erroneous.
Progressive offers a product to the public that must strictly conform to
Utah law.3 It is a quasi-public corporation — like a water company, a railroad,
or a common carrier. 17 C.J.S. Contracts, §§ 222-223. The "intentional acts
exclusion" rendered the contract partially void. IdL at § 289. Equity does not
favor allowing a quasi-public company to keep money that it obtained through
an illegal contract. I d at § 278(b) (when a party is protected by a statute, he is
not in pari delicto and is entitled to relief). Indeed, a court of equity is a court
2

Unquestionably wrong in light of Speros v. Fricke.

3

Freedom of contract is both a property and a liberty interest protected
by due process. But mandatory automobile insurance is not a choice. If
motorists refuse to buy it, the state deems them criminals and punishes them.
Therefore, the insurers who issue mandatory policies owe heightened duties
not to take unfair advantage of regular citizens and to exercise the obligation to
speak, if at all, only after obtaining knowledge to which insurers have access.
1

of conscience and will disregard that which interferes with principles of justice.
30 C.J.S. Equity, § 89.

II.

THE "STANDING" RULING OF JENSEN I PRECLUDES
THE APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA.

If "standing" means subject-matter jurisdiction, there is no question that
res judicata is inapplicable to this case. If "standing" means something else, it
has to be defined before it means anything. If the explanation for the rule is
purely historical, "it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." O. W. Holmes, The Path of
the Law. 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
The Jensen I court ruled that Davis County had no cause of action in tort
or contract against Progressive. Therefore, claim preclusion obviously cannot
apply under any definition of "standing." Issue preclusion is worth debating.
It does not apply, but that shall be discussed later. First, the proper view of
"standing."
A judgment creditor that is entitled to receive money owed by an
insurance company on behalf of a judgment debtor essentially seeks to
prosecute the rights of the judgment debtor against his own debtor under a
contract. This circumstance is not unlike, and arguably is, a type of derivative
action. This analysis helps illustrate a valid and substantial basis for
"standing" under Utah law.
An example from the 7th Circuit discussing derivative corporate actions is
helpful because it is not founded on the Article III version of standing. The
discussion clarifies an important purpose served by the rule denying standing
2

to sue to those who suffer only derivative injury — preventing double payment
for the same injury.
When the injury is derivative, recovery by the indirectly
injured person is a form of double counting. "Corporation"
is but a collective noun for real people — investors,
employees, suppliers with rights and o t h e r s . . . . A blow that
costs "the firm" $100 injures one or more of those persons.
If, however, we allow the corporation to litigate in its own
name and collect the whole sum (as we do), we must exclude
attempts by the participants in the venture to recover for
their individual injuries. A fire that causes $100 worth of
damage to "the corporation", and therefore reduces the
value of investors' stock by $100, does not cause a total
injury of $200 — the net loss is $100, and everyone is made
whole by an award of that sum to the firm. To avoid double
counting courts must either restrict recoveries to the
directly-injured party or attempt to apportion the
recovery according to who bears the effects.
Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago. 877 F.2d 1333,
1335-36 (7th Cir. 1989) (bold added); see also Twin Citv Fire Insurance Co. v.
Country Mutual Insurance Co.. 23 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois
law and discussing direct and derivative distinctions in litigation between a
primary carrier and an excess carrier in a subrogation action).
When Jensen injured Davis County, the Plaintiff suffered a loss of about
$15,000. Since Jensen was legally liable for $15,000, he was injured when
Progressive refused to honor its obligation to indemnify him for his liability. It
is important not to double count. The total injury was $15,000. If the law
allows Jensen to collect the whole amount of his injury from Progressive (as it
does) and then allowed Davis County to collect the whole amount of its injury,
Progressive could be held liable for $30,000 resulting from a single injury of
$15,000. That would be wrong, of course. Therefore, preventing double
payment for a single wrong is a valid reason for denying "standing" when two
3

parties have a cause of action for an insurance company's single instance of
misconduct.
But allowing the insurance company to profit from its own misconduct
would be worse than making it pay twice.4 Therefore, the issue of "standing"
must be defined, clarified and limited by articulable standards in order to
advance the public policy underlying mandatory insurance. Guidelines and
definitions are necessary lest slippery terms like "standing" replace reasoned
jurisprudence with reasoning by rote.
If a third party's injury is viewed as a derivative injury caused by the
insurer's refusal to honor its promises to its insured, the ruling of the Jensen I
court can be harmonized with equitable and legal principles. Insurance law
encourages insurance companies to pay what they owe when they owe it.
A proper underpinning for "standing" can be a prophylactic rule
preventing both the injured party and the insured from recovering twice for a
single breach of the insurance contract. That underpinning can also prevent
insurer misconduct that would provide a windfall for insurers that refuse to
honor promises made to their insureds and to the public.5
Once a proper understanding of the rule is formulated, one then can
4

All an insurance company needs to do to avoid the possibility of being
held liable twice for a single injury is to obey the law and honor its promises.
Since compliance with the law should be encouraged and since this potential
parade of horribles that could result in double counting only results from
insurer misconduct, the law should not be too preoccupied with finding ways to
protect insurers from problems of their own making.
5

See, ag,, Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp.. 2007 UT 96, If 16 ("By
extracting a preinjury release from Mr. Rothstein for liability due to their
negligent acts, Snowbird breached this public policy bargain."); see also Warren
v. Melville. 937 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1997) (discussing public policy and
mandatory automobile insurance).
4

understand the limitations of the rule and the interplay between the rule and
general principles like res judicata. One can also disregard "standing" when,
for example, all parties are joined in a single action so that double counting
ceases to be a concern. When double counting ceases to be a concern, courts
may require insurers to honor their promises. Specifically, trial courts may
provide the remedy due to the insured and to the injured third party by issuing
a proper and well-reasoned judgment satisfying the demands of justice and
unencumbered by unclear terms like "standing."

III.

PROGRESSIVE LACKED "STANDING" TO OBTAIN A
RULING AGAINST JENSEN BECAUSE IT FAILED TO
FILE A CROSS-CLAIM.

Progressive argues that Judge Allphin's order should prevail despite
having been vacated by Jensen I. Opposition at pp. 10-11. Even if the
judgment had not been vacated by the appellate ruling of Jensen /, Progressive
still could not rely on Judge Allphin's order.
Progressive cannot satisfy its burden relating to res judicata because it
failed to file a cross-claim against Jensen. As a result, it lacked "standing" to
obtain a judgment that would bind Jensen. See National Service Industries,
Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co.. Inc., 937 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that
a joint tortfeasor must join any other party who may have caused or
contributed to the injury or damage under Rule 13(f) in order to have standing
to challenge a motion for summary judgment). Progressive cannot prove that
the parties were the same, that the matter was fully and fairly litigated or that

5

several other elements of res judicata were satisfied.6 And, of course, the
failure of any element is the failure of the affirmative defense(s).

IV.

DAVIS COUNTY IS DIRECTLY ATTACKING THE
JUDGMENT; THEREFORE, RES JUDICATA DOES NOT
APPLY.

There exists a distinction in the law between a collateral attack on a
judgment and a direct attack on a judgment. Res judicata only applies to the
former posture.
In a direct, as distinguished from a collateral, attack on a
judgment, the judgment does not, of course, operate as res
judicata precluding relief, since the validity and binding
effect of the judgment is the very matter in issue on such
direct attack.
50 C.J.S. Judgments, § 594. Plaintiff argues that the order issued by Judge
Allphin was a nullity. The only order in Jensen I was the opinion issued by the
Utah Court of Appeals. Opening Brief at pp. 15-17. The appellate opinion
created a blank slate and Judge Allphin's opinion was no longer operative after
the Jensen I appellate opinion. 49 C.J.S. Judgments, § 410 (distinguishing
between direct and collateral attacks on a judgment).

V.

DAVIS COUNTY HAS A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION;
THEREFORE, RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY.

Progressive's argument hinges on the concept of retroactive application
of the law to a preexisting cause of action. See Opposition at pp. 11-12. That
argument is based on a false premise. Davis County does not seek retroactive
6

Davis County recognizes this argument is inconsistent with the rest of
its arguments that are critical of "standing." But if "standing" is important,
the goose/gander principle must apply.
6

application of the law. Davis County also does not argue that Spews v. Fricke
changed7 the law. Davis County argues that a new cause of action accrued
under Section 201 and that the new statutory cause of action forms the basis
for this new litigation and this new appeal. See Opening Brief at pp. 12-13.
Davis County seeks the proper application of the law to a cause of action
that only accrued when all elements of its cause of action came into existence.8
Because Davis County brings a fresh cause of action, res judicata is no defense.
The Collins case relied upon by Progressive (at p. 12) recognizes that res
judicata does not apply to "a new substantive right.. .." Collins v. Sandv Citv
Board of Adjustment 2002 UT 77,1114, 52 P.3d 1267. A new substantive right
was created by Section 201 without regard to Spews v. Fricke. That
substantive right only accrued after Davis County's fruitless effort to enforce
its judgment against Jensen.

VI.

DAVIS COUNTY'S NEW CAUSE OF ACTION IS A
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT.

Section 201 creates a separate cause of action that permits a judgment
creditor to bring a direct action against a judgment debtor's insurance
company. This cause of action is subject to two conditions. First, a judgment
creditor must obtain a judgment. Second, execution on the judgment must be
returned nulla bona. This new cause of action permits the judgment creditor
7

When a party seeks equity, it must do equity. Progressive invokes the
equitable principle of estoppel, but it admits it did not investigate the legality of
its exclusion as permitted by law. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-2-307 permits
insurers to investigate assumptions about the requirements of the law.
8

Progressive's argument that Davis County's new cause of action has
still not accrued would, of course, result in a third lawsuit.
7

to enforce the rights held by the judgment debtor vis-a-vis his insurance
company.
Every liability insurance policy shall provide that the
bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured may not
diminish any liability of the insurer to third parties,
and that if execution against the insured is
returned unsatisfied, [9] an action may be
maintained against the insurer to the extent that the
liability is covered by the policy.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-201 (bold added).

Progressive argues that the statutory cause of action created by Section
201 is limited10 to bankruptcy and insolvency. Opposition at p. 13. Its
argument fails to attempt to provide definitions. Even if its reading of the
statute were correct, that reading avails Progressive of nothing.
The first line of the statute is an absolute clause. It is grammatically
independent of the second clause. Nevertheless, it is related to the second
clause. The first clause describes a provision that must be set forth in the
policy. The second clause declares the remedy that is established by the
Legislature in the enacting language. In other words, there is a notice section
and a remedy section.
Even if Progressive's three-prong approach were appropriate, such an
9

"Execution returned unsatisfied" is a term of art with a peculiar
meaning in the law. UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-11 ("Words and phrases are to be
construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; but
technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be construed
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.")
(bold added).
10
nd

The grammatical structure and punctuation of this statute resembles
the 2 Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." U.S. CONST., Amend. II.
8

analysis would require the Court to craft a suitable definition of "insolvency."11
Given the purpose of mandatory insurance and the general public policy
favoring efficiency in lieu of expensive and clumsy litigation, the "general
failure to pay" definition derived from the U.C.C. is probably the best
definition. James Jensen has not paid the judgment. Requiring a judgment
creditor to perform a qualitative analysis of Jensen's finances would only serve
to protect insurers that breach the duty to defend and would tend to enrich
those parasitic companies that would sprout up to service the need to create
unnecessary evidence, but it would serve no useful purpose or provide
protection for innocent victims. 17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 225 (declaring void
contracts that are entered into for the purpose of creating evidence designed to
increase the cost of litigation); 46 C.J.S. Insurance, § 1463.
Progressive may perform a qualitative analysis of Jensen's finances if it
possesses a right of subrogation.12 But it cannot impose extrastatutory
obligations on injured third parties because that would constitute the unlawful

11

See, e&, UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-la-201(2)(w) ("(w) Insolvent' means:
(i) having generally ceased to pay debts in the ordinary course of business other
than as a result of bona fide dispute; (ii) being unable to pay debts as they
become due; or (hi) being insolvent within the meaning of federal bankruptcy
law."); compare UTAH CODE ANN. 31A-1-30K81) ("(81) Insolvency' means that:
(a) an insurer is unable to pay its debts or meet its obligations as they mature;
(b) an insurer's total adjusted capital is less than the insurer's mandatory
control level RBC under Subsection 31A-17-601(8)(c); or (c) an insurer is
determined to be hazardous under this title.").
12

Progressive arguably waived subrogation rights. It likely has no right
of subrogation in this case because of its failure to inquire as to the legality of
its intentional acts exclusion. But, in the future, Progressive can certainly
obtain a right of subrogation against the insured when it honors its obligations
owed to the public and innocent third parties to investigate its rights before it
denies claims for many decades based on an illegal exclusion.
9

creation of a new condition precedent that is not authorized by the
Legislature in Section 201.

VII. PROCEDURAL PROCESSES ARE NOT APPROPRIATE
FOR THE TASK AT HAND.
Modern rules of procedure are intended to allow the court to reach the
merits of a cause of action. The rules are designed to give effect to the
constitutional right of access to the courts (on the merits) and the
constitutional right of appeal (on the merits). In other words, the rules are
designed to expedite litigation, not to allow narrow constructions or
technicalities to interfere with the merits of a legitimate controversy.
Rule 18(b) provides that contingent remedies may be joined in a single
cause of action. UTAH R. ClV. P. 18(b). For example, a plaintiff may sue a
defendant together with the party to whom the defendant fraudulently
conveyed property in a single action. If this procedural rule applied to the
present situation, two conclusions could properly be drawn: (1) Jensen I was
incorrectly decided because the "standing" that requires prior adjudication of
one party's rights as a condition to the ability to enforce a remedy against a
second party is provided by Rule 18; and (2) Retroactive application of the law
to fix or not to fix the error of Jensen I would be a relevant legal framework for
analyzing Jensen L
The inquiry relating to the foregoing conclusions is twofold. Whether
Rule 18 should have been applied in Jensen I? And whether Section 201 is a
procedural statute rather than a substantive right that is not subject to res
13

See UTAH R. CIV. P. 9(c).

10

judicata principles? Both questions are properly answered in the negative.
Section 201 creates a new cause of action. It is not merely procedural.
There are sound public policy justifications for the Utah Legislature's adoption
of a separate cause of action. And the Rule 18(b) procedure is less efficient
than recognizing Davis County's fresh cause of action.
A.

Insurance Should Be Separated From Tort Law.

The fear14 of injecting insurance into tort claims is largely illusory. Many
tautologies and slogans15 have been developed and "readily seized upon as
pronouncements of this court and vigorously advanced to do yeoman service in
cases of dubious worth." Hess v. Robinson. 163 P.2d 510, 514 (Utah 1945)
(Wolfe, J. concurring in the result). But the fear is overstated. Nevertheless,
the bedrock principle underlying separation is valid and important.
Although tort liability and contractual liability should be separated, in
struggling to reach that legitimate goal, the "[u]se of the same phrase[s] to
refer to . . . two separate doctrines[16] has created some confusion" in the law.
14

See Robinson v. Hreinson. 409 P.2d 121, 122-23 (Utah 1965) ("We are
not so callous as to be entirely without appreciation for the position of the
defendant in such circumstances, though perhaps not quite so keenly affected
as defense counsel, who quite generally seem to have highly developed
sensibilities to the mention of the subject of insurance, in some instances
entirely too much so, of which we think this is a good example. In our
judgment there are some basic fallacies involved in assuming that any mention
of insurance automatically results in such prejudice that a motion for a mistrial
should invariably be granted.").
15

See, e ^ , Young v, Barney, 433 P.2d 846, n. 8 (Utah 1967) ("We could
not make it any more definite unless we said damn it.").
16

The two doctrines are negligence and indemnification for legal
liability. One problem is the common use of "insurance defense" work to
describe tort defense work. The insurance part of insurance defense involves
nothing more than the insurer receiving the negligence judgment and then
11

Hale v. Beckstead. 2005 UT 24,11 7, 116 P.3d 263. In a normal tort cause of
action, insurance is not relevant.
Insurance is eminently relevant to a tortfeasor's ability to pay and to a
victim's hope of being made whole. But since ability to pay is not one of the
elements of a negligence cause of action, insurance is irrelevant. Since
insurance is irrelevant, it is inadmissible in a trial adjudicating a person's
negligence. UTAH R. EVID. 402; but see UTAH R. EviD. 411.
However, substantive relevance of a fact is only slightly relevant to the
propriety of joining multiple parties and contingent remedies in a single case.
See, e.g.. UTAH R. CIV. P. 42(b); UTAH R. CIV. P. 21. Most of the cases
expressing sensitivity to the need to erect an impregnable wall between tort
litigation and insurance coverage were decided prior to the adoption of the
Financial Responsibility Act in 1973. See Dairvland Ins. Corp. v. Smith. 646
P.2d 737 (Utah 1982) (declining to follow "cases which are inapplicable here
because they predate the enactment of the Utah Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act. . . ."). 17 That distinction places some weight on both sides of the
paying it. That is all. The cases discussed in Jensen I were not wholly wrong
when viewed in the proper context, but the statements set forth in the cases
cited in Jensen I did not contemplate the situation presented by this case.
"Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states, 'All laws of a general
nature shall have uniform operation.' The principle that "persons similarly
situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different
circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were
the same," Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 699 (Utah 1984), is so fundamental
to Utah law that Article I, section 2 of the Utah Constitution declares that an
integral purpose of a free government is to ensure the equal protection of the
law to the people." McCorvev v. Utah State Dept. of Transp.. 868 P.2d 41
(Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting) (bold added).
n '"pjrig legislative action [addition of the no-fault statute to the safety
responsibility act] reflected a public policy requiring minimum coverage to
protect innocent victims of automobile accidents." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. CalL
12

scale and cannot be the end of the analysis.
B.

Section 201 Is Not Superseded By Rule 18.

Rule 18 and Section 201 must be compared and contrasted in order to
determine whether Section 201 was superseded18 by the adoption of Rule 18.
The Utah Supreme Court has exclusive authority to adopt and to implement
procedural rules. UTAH CONST. Art VIII, § 4. If Section 201 is merely a
procedural rule, it may be governed by the retroactivity jurisprudence relied
upon by Progressive in its Opposition Brief.
When an insurance company believes it has a defense to a potential claim
for indemnification, it should almost always defend its insured. Declaratory
relief that purports to find facts that would also be determined in the primary
cause of action between the tortfeasor/insured and the victim/plaintiff should
almost never be permitted. Mostly this conclusion is premised on
considerations of judicial efficiency, but fairness to insureds and protection of
third-party victims from indiscriminate application of res judicata are
principles that are also implicated.

712 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1985).
18

See Sorensen v. Barbuto. 2008 UT 8 ("118 This court has previously
held that 'rule 506 supersedes section 78-25-8(4), and . . . rule 506 applies to
both criminal and civil proceedings/ Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14,1f 12 & n.2,
133 P.3d 370 (citing Utah Rule of Evidence 506 advisory committee note
(stating that rule 506 is intended to supersede statutory privilege)); see also
Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58,11 24 n.2, 999 P.2d 582 (holding that the scope
of the physician-patient privilege is exclusively controlled by rule 506).").
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C.

Equity Disfavors Inequality That Might Result From a
Procedural Rather Than a Substantive Form of Relief.

Declaratory relief arose out of equity.19 This form of relief is now
codified.20 There is also a procedural rule that addresses that right of access to
the court. UTAH R. Civ. P. 57.21 But the statute and the rule, like Section 201,
are not exclusive; rather both rules are cumulative and are designed to
recognize the equitable right while neither preempting the common law nor
purporting to provide a stand-alone scheme. See, e ^ , Derbidge v. Mutual
Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1998) (discussing the codification
of only some aspects of a rescission cause of action).
When an insurer seeks equitable relief, it must demonstrate that the
bases for its effort to repudiate its contractual obligations do not overlap with
facts underlying the tort litigation. Only when the facts giving rise to a
potential defense to the indemnification obligation are unrelated to the facts
underlying the tort litigation is it appropriate for an insurance company to seek
declaratory relief. And an insurer that fails to defend or seek declaratory relief

19

See Moretrench American Corp. v. S. J. Groves and Sons Co.. 839 F.2d
1284,1286 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing the source of the declaratory judgment
action and concluding that its lineage is "confused").
20

UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-2-307 ("The commissioner or any other person
with a substantial interest in the result may petition the Third District Court
for Salt Lake County for a declaratory judgment interpreting any provision of
this title as applied to stipulated facts."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-103
("Successive actions may be maintained upon the same contract or transaction
if, after a former action, a new cause of action arises from it.").
21

Rule 57 permits declaratory judgment actions to proceed at the same
time as an underlying tort action "where it is appropriate." Plaintiff provides
guidance for that limitation to assist the Court to understand how to determine
whether "it is appropriate." No Utah cases are listed in the 2008 West
Annotated version of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
14

is gambling.
Since the insurer that chooses to gamble is avoiding the costs of defense
and is violating the public policy surrounding mandatory automobile insurance,
it is not surprising that the insurer's repudiation of its obligations results in
estoppel to raise coverage defenses. In this case, Progressive concedes that it
did not know that its "intentional acts" exclusion was void. Since it did not
know what the law was, its gamble was recklessly self-interested.
Unless, of course, it could shift the loss to a third-party such as Davis
County and take refuge in inapt procedural hurdles. Under the legal theories
presented by Progressive, its refusal to investigate its obligations or to defend
its insured would have been no gamble at all. Its argument would permit
insurers to avoid promises set forth in insurance contracts whenever an
insured is an irresponsible person who is unlikely to sue it.22
This procedure would encourage insurance companies to investigate its
insured's propensity or capacity to fight against a multi-billion-dollar
corporation instead of investigating its own legal obligations. It could factor in
the likelihood of its insured being sued by medical providers and the
subrogated insurance company into its analysis. And it could conclude that the
combination of attacks on its insured by other parties might forestall any risk
of being held responsible for paying the losses that it promised to pay in
exchange for the many years of premiums paid by the insured.
Public policy seeks to discourage such heads-I-win-tails-you-lose
22

Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 127, 138
(Utah 1997) ("Holding otherwise would not only lead to an inequitable result
but may also conflict with our stated policy of encouraging prompt payments to
the insured, leaving disputes concerning coverage to be determined later.").
15

gambling by insurance companies with their insureds' money. Therefore, both
the court system and the Legislature create mechanisms that foreclose (or at
least forestall) unfair abuses. Whatever the correct procedure might be, one
thing is certain: The procedure cannot prevent the administration of justice or
encourage insurers to undermine public policy. Progressive's procedure would
provide a cloak of protection for misfeasance, nonfeasance and malfeasance.
D.

Davis County's Relief In This Case Creates Good Law.

The answer, then, must be derived from a mechanism that harmonizes
all three relevant factors described in more detail below. The mechanism
advanced by Davis County harmonizes all three factors.
First, permitting victims/plaintiffs to sue the tortfeasor and the
insurance company in a single action under Rule 18(b) is a workable procedure.
But it would increase complexity whenever the insurer defends under a
reservation of rights and justifiably waits to see how the facts are adjudicated
in the tort litigation to make a coverage decision. Therefore, that procedure is
unwise.
Second, permitting insurers to file declaratory judgment actions to
resolve the same factual questions that would otherwise be determined in the
tort litigation is workable procedure. But only if the insurer provides its
insured with Cumis counsel to contest the declaratory judgment action and
only if the victim/plaintiff is joined as a party. If these two conditions are not
satisfied, insurers could (and some insurers frequently do) overwhelm the
insured and create additional questions as to res judicata relating to the facts
"determined" in the declaratory judgment action. Rulings from declaratory
16

judgment actions of this type cannot protect the insured and would injure
innocent victims/plaintiffs by eliminating the protection that is mandatory
under the law by purporting to find facts that are contrary to the facts that a
victim/plaintiff would prove in a tort action. This procedure also would create
additional litigation as a result of victims rightfully refusing to be bound by a
declaratory judgment action that lacked a truly full and fair adjudicative
process.
Third, providing a separate statutory cause of action to a third party
thereby conferring the right to obtain compensation from an insurer that
wrongfully repudiates its contractual obligations (as the Legislature did when
it adopted Section 201) is the best solution. This procedure encourages
insurers to defend insureds. It naturally leads to the proper separation
between tort law and insurance coverage law. It fosters respect for express
statutory terms and the spirit of the law. And it discourages attempts to
import arcane federal questions like "standing" that might serve to constrain
the full authority of the judicial branch of government as defined by the Utah
Constitution. The fresh cause of action approach maintains the substantive
rights of all parties while honoring due process and achieving efficiency.
E.

The Scope of the Remedy Is the Value of the Judgment,
Plus Interest Imposed by Law.

The next step is to analyze the remedy that is appropriate when, as here,
an insurer draws a conclusion in its best interest and thereby injures innocent
third parties such as Davis County. Again, a choice between contract law and
tort law is presented. Either Davis County can step into the shoes of the
tortfeasor/insured and maintain all his causes of action including the tort of
17

bad faith, or Davis County can step into the shoes of the tortfeasor/insured for
the limited purpose of being made whole by enforcing its judgment against the
party that promised to provide indemnification to Jensen. The contract-based
remedy is superior.
Moreover, the contract-based remedy gives effect to the proper
interpretation of the descriptive portion of the second clause of Section 201:
"an action may be maintained against the insurer to the extent[23] that the
liability is covered by the policy." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-201 (bold
added). Whether the "liability is covered" must be distinguished from
situations where liability is subject to an affirmative defense called a coverage
limit. A limitation, like an exclusion, is an affirmative defense.
Like any affirmative defense, the coverage limit defense can be waived.
Principles of estoppel and waiver preclude invocation of defenses such as
coverage limits when an insurer refuses to defend.24 This concept is distinct
from the concept of expanding coverage through estoppel.25
23

"To the extent that" does not mean "up to coverage limits as set forth
in the declarations page." If the legislature wanted to limit the amount of
liability by reference to coverage limits, it would have used the latter phrase.
The limiting language used by the legislature clarifies that, for example,
defamation liability is not covered by an automobile policy and that type of
liability is not subsumed in Section 201.
24

The distinction will not be discussed in great detail here because the
loss giving rise to the judgment against Jensen was within coverage limits. It is
only raised to apprise the Court of other issues that may arise in other cases to
assist it in distinguishing between analytically-distinct concepts.
25

For example, if an insured demands indemnification under liability
coverage contained in an auto policy for slugging his erstwhile friend after
driving to his friend's house and the insurer issues a denial letter that is
conclusory and deficient, the insurer would be estopped from invoking defenses
not raised in the declination letter. However, courts would not expand the
coverage provided under the policy by estoppel — i.e., courts would not require
18

If Davis County had been able to locate Jensen, it was entitled to
formally execute on all Jensen's causes of action against Progressive. The trial
court could have entered a judgment in supplemental proceedings transferring
the tort remedies possessed by Jensen to Davis County. See, &&., UTAH R. Civ.
P. 70. Jensen also could have sold (e.g., through an express assignment) all of
his tort claims against Progressive. Because these cumulative rights exist
under Utah law, it is unwise to read this remedy into Section 201.
Section 201 should be read in a manner that creates a simple procedure.
The simple procedure must make innocent third parties whole at the lowest
cost to the parties and to the judiciary. These are the goals of equity expressed
through Section 201.
Under the proper procedure, Davis County has satisfied every element
required by Section 201. First, Davis County obtained a judgment against
Jensen for his negligence. Second, Davis County has been unable to locate
Jensen 26 thereby satisfying the fruitless execution requirement. Third, Davis
County proved that Progressive breached its contract: (a) Progressive insured
Jensen and owed him a defense and indemnification, (b) Jensen's legal liability
was established by a default judgment, (c) Progressive refused to defend or
indemnify Jensen after receiving notice of the default judgment,27 and (d) Davis

the insurer to indemnify the insured for a harm that did not arise out of the
use, ownership or maintenance of a motor vehicle.
26

In the negligence action Davis County could not locate Jensen and,
therefore, resorted to service by publication under UTAH R. Civ. P. 4.
27

Plaintiff called this status an executory contract in the opening brief
but this terminology usage was wrong. An executory contract is one that is
awaiting performance by both parties.
19

County's judgment 28 is now valued at approximately $25,814.82 (with postjudgment interest). Opening Brief at p. 27.
F.

Affirmative Defenses Are Waived, But this Point is Not
Crucial in this Case.

The last step of the proper procedure under Section 201 is to analyze
whether Progressive is entitled to invoke an affirmative defense contained in
the insurance policy as alluded to above. Progressive waived the coverage limit
defense by failing to plead it. Had Progressive pleaded it or raised it below, it
would have been able to argue that its liability is limited to $15,000.00.
This point merits some discussion because the amount of damages
available under Section 201 litigation is an indispensable element of the proper
procedure. When an insurance company repudiates all of its obligations under
an insurance policy, it cannot rely on the coverage limit contained in the policy.
This is the natural result of public policy and traditional contract law
principles. In the insurance industry this concept is known as "opening up"
the policy limits.
Most of the cases dealing with the insurer's failure to settle
involve an insurer who had assumed the defense of the
action against the insured. Those cases differ from the case
at hand, since American never assumed control of the
defense in the case at hand. However, the reason
American was not in control of the litigation is that
it wrongfully refused to defend Campbell, III, and
Davis County is entitled to an award of attorney fees under the
third-party litigation rule. However, Davis County failed to preserve this right
during the litigation in front of Judge Henriod. If this matter is remanded for
any additional litigation, Plaintiff shall be entitled to seek attorney fees. If the
Court remands for the sole purpose of entering a judgment in favor of Davis
County or if it simply enters a judgment as part of its remand order, then the
applicability of the third-party litigation rule to this circumstance will have to
await determination in another case.
20

this breach of its contract to defend should not
release it from its implied duty to consider
Campbell's interest in the settlement. When American
denied liability, it did so at its own risk, and although its
position may not have been entirely groundless, if the
denial is found to be wrongful, it is liable for the full
amount of a judgment against its insured, including
any portion in excess of the policy limits.
Blakelv v. American Employers' Insurance Company. 424 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.
1970) (bold added); see also Mid-America Bank & Trust Co. v. Commercial
Union Insurance Co.. 224 111. App. 3d 1083, 1087 (1992); Coleman v. Holecek.
542 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying Kansas law); 14 Couch on Insurance
§203:12 (3d rev. ed. 1999).
For example, when an insurer chooses to defend a tort action and has the
chance to settle for policy limits but chooses to take a chance at trial, it is
common practice for insurers to pay the full judgment. There are two reasons
for this practice. First, it protects against bad faith litigation. Second, it is
required by traditional notions of contract law, fiduciary duties and the
foreseeability of consequential damages.
When a party breaches a contract, that party is liable for general
damages as well as consequential damages. In Beck v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme Court
began with the general rule that "[djamages recoverable for
breach of contract include both general damages, i.e., those
flowing naturally from the breach, and consequential
damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of,
or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the
contract was made." We recognized that in appropriate
circumstances, "consequential damages for breach of
contract may reach beyond the bare contract terms," and
therefore, that the monetary limits of an insurance policy do
not invariably define the amount for which the insurer may
be liable upon a breach.
21

Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah 1996) (citations
omitted). In bad faith cases a broad measure of consequential damages is
available — including mental anguish. The broad measure of consequential
damages available for bad faith is not available in Section 201 litigation. Beck.
701 P.2d at 466. Only the consequential damages that were foreseeable by
Jensen and Progressive at the time they entered into the contract are
recoverable by the judgment creditor. If the interest imposed by law were
viewed as consequential damages, it could hardly be questioned that the
interest is recoverable.
Consequential damages are subject to a three-part analysis.29 If the
prejudgment and postjudgment interest were viewed as consequential
damages, that sum would be available under the principles described above.
However, the superior characterization of prejudgment and postjudgment
interest is as a legal duty.
While a contract may limit an insurer's liability under a contract that is
performed according to its terms, parties may not contract to avoid duties
imposed by law. It is the law that imposed the interest that Davis County is
entitled to recover.30 Therefore, the coverage limit set forth by Progressive in
its policy are not relevant here. The original loss was less than $15,000.00.
29

"(1) that the plaintiff has, in fact, incurred damages, (2) that the
amount of such damages is established with reasonable certainty, and (3) that
such damages were within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting." Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Utah App.
1997).
30

Statutory interest is just a time value of money issue. It is the obverse
of reducing future damages to present value using a market-based discount
rate; interest increases past damages to present value according to a statutory
rate.
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The law required minimum coverage limits of $15,000.00 for property damage
liability. Progressive owes the interest as a consequence of its own failure to
pay what it owed when it owed it. If the interest obligation were eliminated,
the law would be emasculated and insurers would lack any incentive to honor
their legal and contractual obligations in a timely manner.

VIII. RES JUDICATA IS JUDGE-MADE PRINCIPLE THAT:
(A) DOES NOT APPLY; AND (B) SHOULD NOT APPLY.
Res judicata literally means a thing settled by judicial decision. The
"thing" at issue is the obligation of an auto carrier to indemnify insureds
whose conduct may be described as intentional. The "thing" is a legal principle
founded upon statutory enactments. The "thing" was decided in the negative
by Judge Allphin. The "thing" was later decided in the affirmative by the Utah
Supreme Court.
Of course, it would be error to confuse stare decisis with res judicata.
Nobody disputes that the legally-correct "thing" is the Speros "thing." Instead,
res judicata is a judge-made rule favoring finality for the state (i.e., judicial
system) and favoring finality for individuals (i.e., the prevention of hardship to
individuals who might otherwise be sued twice for the same wrong)31 while
being cognizant of the cost to society and individuals that would result from
the needless propagation of legal errors.32

"Res judicata is an affirmative defense in both criminal and civil
cases[.]" State v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927, 931 n.3 (Utah 1992).
32

Many hundreds of claims are adjusted weekly and errors contained in
appellate opinions can injure many hundreds of people who honor their legal
obligations to purchase mandatory insurance.
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The judicial system would not benefit from refusing to dispense justice
correctly in this case. And Progressive is not an individual — it is a
corporation whose business involves constant litigation and whose
underwriters crave predictability33 much more than judicial reluctance to
disturb decisions even if wrongly decided.34
Res judicata35 is "not an inflexible, universally applicable principle/' 3D
Constr. & Dev.. L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co.. 2005 UT App 307, UK 1725, 117 P.3d 1082 (citations omitted). "Courts, then, must carefully consider
whether granting preclusive effect to a prior decision is appropriate." IcL
Courts are supposed to apply res judicata carefully with an eye toward the
overarching goal of dispensing justice and improving the law for the benefit of
citizens, the bench and the bar.
A.

Issue Preclusion Does Not Apply.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, involves a different cause of
action and prevents relitigation of factual issues that have been once litigated.
Collateral estoppel requires that the factual issue decided in
the prior action is the same factual issue presented in the
second action. Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226,1230
33

Moreover, justice for Davis County in this case will benefit Progressive
and other insurers that routinely deal with the several less-than-scrupulous
companies (not named here) that are currently doing business in the State of
Utah as insurers.
34

Courts ought to "look to the effect each plausible meaning of statutory
language will have in practical application." Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co.. 799
P.2d 231, 233 (Utah App.1990).
35

Res judicata is often said to have two branches. That is not strictly
true because there are other branches such as bar and merger. See Robertson
v. Campbell 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983). What have been denominated
issue preclusion and claim preclusion are the two main branches.
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n. 1 (Utah 1983). Additionally, the issue actually litigated in
the first suit must have been essential to the resolution of
that suit. Id. at 1230.
Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno. 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah App. 1987) (bold
added).
There is no factual issue that is being disputed. The only dispute relates
to the proper application of law to the undisputed facts which were established
by the judgment against Jensen that triggered Progressive's obligation to
provide its reciprocal performance. Both the ruling by Judge Allphin and the
Jensen I opinion were based on summary judgment postures and a summary
judgment, by definition, does not result in factual determinations. The
incorrect application of law to fact by Judge Allphin would not be res judicata
even if it had survived Jensen I.

CONCLUSION
The district court's order should be reversed and a judgment should be
entered by this Court against Progressive and in favor of Davis County.
Section 201 provides a substantive remedy that is unaffected by res judicata,
and all its elements are satisfied.
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day of April, 2008.
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